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Case Comment
SCOPE OF REVIEW IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS: The
Government Cannot Appeal A Denial of Extradition Request Based on
the Declaratory Judgment Act - United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1986).
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The United States, on behalf of the United Kingdom, appealed a denial of a motion for declaratory judgment in response to an order denying the extradition of Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty.' A Diplock
Court in Northern Ireland2 convicted Doherty, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), a in absentia for murder, attempted murder, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, and
membership in a proscribed organization.4 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section

1. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
2. The United Kingdom established the Diplock Court System as a special non-jury
tribunal to try terrorist offenses. The Diplock Courts have been criticized because the
trial is by judge, not jury, and testimony of the defendant's accomplice may be the sole
basis of a conviction. Proponents of the system contend that because of terrorist intimidation and retaliation, trial by an impartial jury is difficult at best and, for the same reasons, it is difficult to obtain testimony against a PIRA defendant. The Impact of the
Supplementary Treaty Upon American Domestic Law and Upon the American Constitutional Process in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearings on the Supplementary Treaty
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Supplementary Treaty Hearings]
(Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser). Doherty argued in the district court
that the Diplock Courts are unfair, and that he did not and could not get a fair trial in
Northern Ireland. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For an
analysis of the Diplock Court System prepared by the State Department for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, see 132 CONG. REC. S9168-71 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
3. The PIRA's goal is Irish nationalism, specifically the unification of Ireland
through violence directed against British security forces. See Matter of Doherty, 599 F.
Supp. at 273.
4. Doherty, 786 F.2d at 493. The acts for which Doherty's extradition was requested
date from May 2, 1980. In an attempt to ambush a convoy of British soldiers, Doherty
and other PIRA members seized a private residence in Belfast and held the family as
hostages. When five British Special Air Servicemen arrived carrying machine guns, the
two groups exchanged gunfire and British Captain Herbert Richard Westmacott was
killed. Doherty was arrested and held in a Belfast prison. However, he escaped from
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31841 and the Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,6 the United
States requested Doherty's extradition to the United Kingdom before an
extradition magistrate.7 Doherty asserted that because his actions fell
within the political offense exception to the Treaty,8 the court should
deny the extradition request. The district court agreed, holding that Doherty's acts were political in nature,' and, therefore, not extraditable of-

prison after his trial and came to the United States. Id.
5. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1985) provides:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a
court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension
of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or
magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same,
together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of
State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of
such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.
6. June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
7. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 270.
8. Id. at 272-73. Article V (1)(c)(i) of the Treaty provides:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if: ...
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested
Party as one of a political character; ....
For a detailed discussion of the political offense exception in extradition treaties, see
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); Banoff & Pyle, To SurrenderPolitical Offenders: The PoliticalOffense Exception to Extraditionin United States Law, 16
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 169 (1984); Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.
315 (1983). See generally C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE ExCEPTION TO EXTRADITION (1980).

9. The court reviewed the historical background of the PIRA and found that a political conflict existed in Northern Ireland and Doherty's acts were in furtherance of that
struggle. 599 F. Supp. at 273-74. However, the court concluded that a correct interpretation of the Treaty required a finding that acts that violated international law could not
be regarded as political offenses. Id. at 274. In order to determine whether to apply the
exception, the court "must assess the nature of the act, the context in which it is committed, the status of the party committing the act, the nature of the organization on whose

1986]

REVIEW IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

fenses under the Treaty.10
Rather than adopting the customary approach of submitting the request to another extradition magistrate, al the United States sought collateral review in a declaratory judgment action against Doherty in the same
district court.1 2 The government argued that because the Fifth Circuit
previously held that the Declaratory Judgment Act 3 is available to the
extraditee after a magistrate certifies his extradition, 4 recourse should be
available to a foreign nation after a court denies its extradition request.
In his cross-claim, Doherty motioned for dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction1 5 and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.' The district court granted Doherty's second motion,
holding that declaratory judgment was not a viable option in extradition
proceedings for either the extraditee a7 or, as in Doherty, the requesting
nation.1 s On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed,
Held: where a magistrate denies a request for extradition, the Government may not base an action for collateral review on the Declaratory
Judgment Act and is restricted to submitting the request to another extradition magistrate. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.
1986).
II.• LEGAL BACKGROUND

Extradition is defined as "the process by which a person charged with
or convicted of a crime under the law of one state is arrested in another

behalf it is committed, and the particularized circumstances of the place where the act
takes place." Id. at 275.
10. Id. at 277.
11. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d
1360, 1365-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).
12. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 2201 provides:
(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to
Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, any court
of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
14. 615 F. Supp. at 758 (citing Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965)); see
infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
17. 615 F. Supp. at 759-60.
18. Id. at 761.
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state and returned for trial or punishment to the state under whose law
he has been charged or convicted." 19 Extradition is not required by customary international law.2" Nations generally enter into extradition treaties to obtain the return of fugitive offenders; to facilitate the punishment
of wrong-doers; to avoid sheltering criminals;21 and to avoid the increase
of international tensions. 22 The United States, therefore, will only extradite a fugitive on the basis of a pre-existing treaty with the requesting
nation.28 United States courts will grant extradition only for crimes specified in a particular treaty.2 4 Furthermore, the doctrine of dual criminality applies, requiring that the extraditable conduct be criminal in the
United States as well as in the requesting nation.2 5 United States courts
further require the requesting party to show probable cause that the accused committed the particular offense for which he is charged.2" Under
the doctrine of "specialty", the requesting nation is prohibited from prosecuting the extraditee for any offense other than those for which the
surrendering state agreed to extradite.2 7 Finally, the United States will
not extradite persons accused of political offenses. 28
19.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§§ 486-89 introductory note (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984) [hereinafter RESTATEFor an earlier definition of extradition, see Harvard Research in International
Law, DRAFT CONVENTION ON EXTRADITION, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 21 (Supp. 1935).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, introductory note at 64.
21. In Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981),
the court was concerned that:
Terrorists who have committed barbarous acts elsewhere would be able to flee to
the United States and live in our neighborhoods and walk our streets forever free
from any accountability for their acts. We do not need them in our society. We
have enough of our own domestic criminal violence with which to contend without
importing and harboring with open arms the worst that other countries have to
export.
Id. at 520.
22. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 8, at 173, nn. 20-23.
23. Id. at 176, see also 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (list of nations which are parties to bilateral extradition treaties with the United States); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
STATES
MENT].

287 (1933).
24. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886).
25. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922); Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6
(1916); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
26. See, e.g., Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508 (1911); United States ex rel
Sakaguchi v. Kaululukui, 520 F.2d 726, 729-31 (9th Cir. 1975).
27. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420-21 (1886); Caplan v. Vokes, 649
F.2d 1336, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981).
28. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); Matter of Mackin,
668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), see also supra note 8. Political crimes are either "pure" or
"relative." A "pure" political act is an offense against a government such as treason,
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While an extradition request may be filed directly with a federal
court,29 the requesting nation normally submits it to the Department of
State. 30 The Department of State receives and considers all extradition
requests and if the request conforms to the applicable treaty, it forwards
the appropriate papers to the United States Attorney in the district
where the proposed extraditee is located." The United States Attorney
then files a complaint and seeks an arrest warrant upon preliminary review by a magistrate.3 2 Under section 3184, if the magistrate issues a
warrant he must conduct a hearing to decide whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a charge under the appropriate treaty or convention.3 3 If the magistrate determines that there is insufficient probable
cause or the offense charged is not within the terms of the treaty, he
cannot certify the matter to the Secretary of State for extradition. If,
however, the magistrate finds probable cause and certifies the case, the
Secretary of State may proceed further with the actual issuance of a warrant of surrender to the requesting nation.' The Secretary has the discretion to decline to surrender the extraditee on policy grounds, includ36
ing international relations3 5 or human rights considerations.
Extradition orders by the federal magistrate are, therefore, unique because there is no judgment of guilt or innocence but only a guarantee
that culpability will be determined in a foreign forum.3 7

sedition and espionage. "Relative" political acts include crimes against persons or property incidental to a war, revolution, rebellion or political uprising at the time and place
of the commission of the act. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124.
29. Extradition procedure in the Unites States is codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181,
3184, 3186, 3188-95. For a discussion of international extradition procedure and the law
of the United States, see RESTATEMENT § 479 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
30. Id. at comment a. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981).
31. Eain, 641 F.2d at 508.
32. Id.
33. Id. The extraditee is not entitled to a full trial on the merits at a probable cause
hearing in this country. That determination is to be made by the courts of the requesting
nation. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to the magistrate's hearing. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3186. See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §
316 (1942); Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313
(1962). See generally M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION (1983).
35. See G. HACKWORTH, supra note 34, § 334, at 174.
36. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. E.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir.) (Chambers, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d
Cir), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Some scholars contend that extradition law essentially stopped developing at the turn of the century.38 Older United States Supreme Court
cases illustrate the major precepts which remain valid. 9 One precept, the
doctrine of unappealability of extradition decisions, provides that neither
the extraditee nor the government can appeal the magistrate's decision
directly to a higher court. 40 The extraditee is limited to collateral review
through a writ of habeas corpus.4 The scope of habeas corpus review is
restricted, however, to defer to the magistrate's initial factual determination.42 Specifically, "[h]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether
the magistrate had jurisdiciton, whether the offense charged is within the
treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe
the accused guilty."' 43 A higher court will not review the adequacy of the
evidence establishing the criminality of the accused.44
While the extraditee can obtain habeas corpus review, the government
must submit the request to another extradition magistrate."5 Collins v.
Loisel4" involved an extraditee's third appeal in habeas corpus proceedings to prevent extradition to British India.4 In dismissing the extraditee's claim that a new hearing constituted double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed the government's right to recommence extradition
proceedings before another magistrate after a discharge or withdrawal. 48

38. E.g., Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 247, 253-54

(1982).
39. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1922), discussed infra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text.
40. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1920); Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d
956, 958 (1st Cir. 1976).
41. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed by agreement of parties, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
42. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). See In the Matter of Assarsson,
635 F.2d 1237, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1932); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502

(1896).
43.
44.
45.

Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312 (Holmes, J.).
Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 192 (1902).
E.g., Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1365.

46. 262 U.S. 426 (1922).
47. Id. at 427.
48. The Court stated:
[I]t has been consistently held under the treaties with Great Britain and other
countries, that a fugitive from justice may be arrested in extradition proceedings a
second time upon a new complaint charging the same crime, where he was discharged by the magistrate on the first complaint or the complaint was withdrawn.

1986]

REVIEW IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

While the Court recognized the possibility of abuse by the government,
Justice Brandeis observed "[p]rotection against unjustifiable vexation and
harassment incident to repeated arrests for the same alleged crime must
ordinarily be sought, not in constitutional limitations or treaty provisions, but in a high sense of responsibility on the part of the public officials charged with duties in this connection."4' 9 More recently federal
courts have construed Collins to hold the government to a good faith
50
standard in recommencing extradition requests.
Attempts at alternative methods of review of extradition orders, both
granted and denied, date back to the initial adoption of section 3184.51 In
1847, one year before Congress enacted the predecessor to section 3184,2
the Supreme Court declared that it had no appellate jurisdiction over
extradition matters in In re Metzger.53 The Court stated that the magistrate exercised "a special authority, and the law has made no provision
for revision of his judgment."' 54 In In re Kaine55 the question of appealability rose again. The British Consul in New York requested Kaine's
extradition for attempted murder in Ireland. 56 A Commissioner of the
United States heard the case and found sufficient evidence to justify commitment for extradition.57 Kaine appealed to the Supreme Court after
the Second Circuit refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus.5 8 A majority
of the Court based its denial of habeas corpus on the merits of the case. 9
In a separate opinion, Justice Curtis, citing Metzger, concluded that the
Commissioner's action was unappealable because "[he] does not exercise
any part of the judicial power of the United States."6 According to Justice Curtis, the Supreme Court could neither review the Second Circuit
decision nor exercise original jurisdiction by issuing the writ of habeas
corpus. 6' The Metzger and Kaine decisions laid the foundation for the
doctrine of unappealability of extradition decisions made by federal

Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

at 429.
Id. at 429-30.
Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1366.
See Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125-26 n.n. 5-8 (discussion of appealability).
9 Stat. 302 (1848).
46 U.S. (5 How.) 175, 190-91 (1847).
Id. at 191.
55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 120-21.
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judges and magistrates.6 2
Although the doctrine of unappealability of extradition decisions was
well-established in the last century, both the government and extraditees
continue to adopt different approaches on which to base appellate review. In 1965, the Fifth Circuit allowed an extraditee to utilize the Declaratory Judgment Act (the Act) 63 to obtain collateral review of an extradition order in Wacker v. Bisson." In Wacker, Canadian officials
requested the extradition of J. Samuel Wacker for violating securities
laws in Canada.6 5 After two unsuccessful attempts to obtain a writ of
habeas corpus, Wacker brought a declaratory judgment suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiciton. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that the scope of review in a
declaratory judgment proceeding was as limited as in a habeas corpus
suit.66 The court held, "review by habeas corpus or declaratory judgment
tests only the legality of the extradition proceedings; the question of the
wisdom of extradition remains for the executive branch to decide." 1 7 The
court then examined the Declaratory Judgment Act and found it to be
an optional and alternative approach available to the extraditee6 8 The

62. The doctrine of unappealability was recognized in an 1853 opinion by Attorney
General Cushing:

Nor can appeal be taken from the decision of Mr. Justice Edmonds to any other
court, so as to revise that decision. The judge or magistrate in this case acts by
special authority under the act of Congress; no appeal is given from his decision by
the act; and he does not exercise any part of what is, technically considered, the
judicial power of the United States.
6 Op. Atty. Gen. 91, 96 (1853), cited in Mackin, 668 F.2d at 127.
Ten years later, in an opinion to Secretary of State Seward, the same view was expressed in somewhat stronger language:
In cases of this kind, the judge or magistrate acts under special authority conferred
by treaties and acts of Congress; and though his action be in form and effect judicial, it is yet not an exercise of any part of what is technically considered the
judicial power of the United States. No appeal from his decision is given by the
law under which he acts, and therefore no right of appeal exists.
10 Op. Atty. Gen. 501, 506, cited in Mackin, 668 F.2d at 127.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (Supp. III 1985).
348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 604.
Id. at 606.
Id.

68. Id. at 607. The court cited Borchard on Declaratory Judgments: "[t]he declaratory judgment is an alternative and entirely optional remedy . . . [Tihere is no justification ordinarily for the refusal of a declaratory judgment on the ground that an executory
judgment was obtainable." Id.; see also Ballard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York,
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court declared that the policies underlying the Act supported its use in
extradition cases.6 9 The Fifth Circuit, however, cautioned that "[i]f the
district court should conclude that Wacker has had a full and fair hearing in the two habeas proceedings on those issues in this case which are
serious, there is no necessity for holding any additional evidentiary
hearing.

70

In his dissenting opinion in Wacker, Judge Rives agreed with the district court that granting Wacker a declaratory judgment would frustrate
the extradition process between the United States and Canada.7' Rives
disagreed with the majority's analogy of exclusion and deportation hearings to extradition cases.7 ' He further disagreed with the appropriateness
of allowing the extraditee to use a declaratory judgment as a review procedure. Rives saw no advantage to the extraditee in using a declaratory
judgment because the scope of judicial review is as limited as habeas
corpus. 73 Agreeing with a Ninth Circuit analysis,74 Rives noted, "there
is nothing in the statutes and nothing in the decisions which permits
cumulative remedies by habeas corpus and declaratory petition against
the same order of deportation or exclusion and a fortiori against the
75
same extradition order."1

As the Fifth Circuit directed, the district court offered an additional
evidentiary hearing on remand,7 but the parties decided to rely on the

109 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1940); Carpenter v. Edmondson, 92 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1937);

Allen v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1935).
69. 348 F.2d at 608.
70.

Id. at 611.

71.

Id. at 612.

Id. The majority had cited Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) for the
proposition that an alien may use a declaratory judgment rather than habeas corpus in
72.

an exclusion proceeding and could also use it to review a deportation order, as per

Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955). 348 F.2d at 608. Judge Rives distinguished exclusion and deportation cases from extradition, stating, "there is a real need

for the remedy by declaratory judgment in exclusion and deportation cases which need
does not exist in extradition orders." Id. at 612. For a discussion of the historical background to extradition law and the related doctrines of exclusion and deportation, see
Comment, Unraveling the Gordian Knot: The United States Law of InternationalExtradition and the Political Offender Exception, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 141 (1980).
73. Id. "The point of holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act has opened a backdoor to review of an extradition order escapes me when the front door provided by the
Great Writ grants access to the same court of justice and provides the same scope of
relief." Id.
74.

See Arellano-Flores v. Rosenberg, 310 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,

374 U.S. 838 (1963); Cruz-Sanchez v. Robinson, 249 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1957).
75. 348 F.2d at 613.
76. Wacker v. Beeson [sic], 256 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1966).
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prior record.7 The court dismissed Wacker's declaratory judgment action7 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.7 9 Wacker's procedural victory,
therefore, ultimately failed to prevent his extradition.
With In re Mackin,80 the government tried yet another approach to
obtain appellate review of a magistrate's decision denying extradition,
but the Second Circuit rejected the government's appeal and its alternative petition for mandamus under 28 U.S.C. section 1651.1 In Mackin,
the United Kingdom requested the extradition of PIRA member
Desmond Mackin. A court in Northern Ireland indicted Mackin on
charges of attempted murder, intent to do grievous bodily harm, and intent to possess firearms and ammunition.82 The magistrate determined
that the United Kingdom had established probable cause to justify
Mackin's committal for trial.8 3 The magistrate found, however, that
Mackin's crimes came within the political offense exception to the
Treaty and declined to issue certification. 4 On appeal, the government
argued that the Act of March 3, 1891,5 which created the federal circuit
courts of appeals, changed the basis for the doctrine of nonappealability

77.

Id. at 543-44.

78. Id. at 545.
79. Wacker v. Bisson, 370 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
936 (1967).
80. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). For a more detailed discussion of the case, see
Note, In re Mackin: Is the Application of the PoliticalOffense Exception an Extradition
Issue for the Judicial or the Executive Branch?, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565 (1982).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982) provides:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court
which has jurisdiction.
82. 668 F.2d at 123-24. On March 16, 1978, Mackin had allegedly wounded a British soldier, Stephen Wooton, in Andersonstown, Belfast, Northern Ireland. Id. at 124.
83. Id. at 124 & n.4. Article IX(l) of the Treaty, supra note 6, states:
(1) Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient according
to the law of the requested Party either to justify the committal for trial of the
person sought if the offense of which he is accused had been committed in the
territory of the requested Party or to prove that he is the identical person convicted
by the courts of the requesting Party.
84. 668 F.2d at 124. United States Magistrate Naomi Buchwald found that the
PIRA was conducting a political uprising in Belfast at the time Mackin committed the
offenses; Mackin was an active PIRA member, and Mackin's offenses were incidential to
his role in the PIRA's political uprising in Belfast. Id. at 125.
85. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
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of extradition orders reflected in the Metzger and Kaine decisions.86 According to the Mackin court, however, this merely meant that the courts
of appeals could exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. The Second Circuit repudiated the government's contention that the Act of 1891 and 28 U.S.C. section 129187 enabled the
courts of appeals to exercise appellate jurisdiction over extradition decisions.8 8 During its examination of the history of the nonappealability of
extradition matters,89 including hearing reports on the proposed Extradition Act of 1981, 9 the court noted that "courts at every level have continued to state that decisions, even when made by district courts, denying
or granting requests for extradition are not appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291." ' 'g The court concluded that section 1291 clearly did not yield an
appellate remedy for the government.92
When it considered the government's petition for mandamus, the court

86. 668 F.2d at 127.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295
of this title.
88. 668 F.2d at 127.
89. Id. at 125-30.
90. Id. at 128-29. According to the court, the government's position in Mackin was
untenable because the government had told Congress that the law was exactly opposite of
what it was now contending. One example the court utilized was a hearing on October
14, 1981, before the Senate Judiciary Committee in which Daniel W. McGovern, Deputy Legal Advisor of the Department of State, said the following:
Under present law there is no direct appeal from a judicial officer's finding in an
extradition proceeding. A person found extraditable may only seek collateral review of the finding, usually through an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
The foreign government that is dissatisfied with the results of the hearing must
institute a new request for extradition. The lack of direct appeal in extradition
matters adds undesirable delay, expense and complication to a process which
should be simple and expeditious. Section 3195 [of the proposed bill] remedies this
defect in current procedure by permitting either party in an extradition case to
appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals from a judge or
magistrate's decision.
Id. at 129 (quoting Extradition Act of 1981: Hearing on S.1639 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981)).
91. 668 F.2d at 127.
92. Id. at 130.
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determined "that mandamus is reserved for 'exceptional cases.' ,,93 According to the Mackin court, the only issue which qualified under the
standard was whether the magistrate had jurisdiction to decide the political offense exception issue."' The government argued that because the
"requested Party" in the Treaty referred to the executive branch of the
United States government, the executive should determine political offender status."5 The court contrasted the language of many other treaties
which specified that the courts would decide the political offense question.9" The government asserted that a judicial determination that the
political offense exception barred extradition might jeopardize the
United States' relations with a foreign nation.9 7 The court reviewed the
precedent and policy determination of the exception,9 8 and concluded
"that, as the law now stands, both the judicial and the executive
branches have recognized that, under § 3184, [the] decision whether a
case falls within the political offense exception is for the judicial officer."9 9 Thus, the court dismissed the government's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction and denied the mandamus application.10 0
In the instant case the United States government attempted to obtain
collateral review of an order denying extradition by requesting a declaratory judgment followed by appeal, an approach successfully followed by
the extraditee in Wacker.
III.

INSTANT OPINION

In Doherty the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.' 0 ' Rejecting the government's position that an extradition
93.

Id. at 131 (citing American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins.

Co., 380 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1967)).
94. 668 F.2d at 131-32.
95. Id. Besides the language of the political offense exception itself, see supra note 8,
the government referred to article XI(1) which states that "[tihe requested Party shall
promptly communicate to the requesting Party through the diplomatic channel the decision on the request for extradition." The government also relied on article XIV(1) which
states that "[tihe requested Party shall make all necessary arrangements for and meet the
cost of the representation of the requesting Party in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition." 668 F.2d at 132.
96. Id. at 133.

97, Id.
98, Id. at 134-37. Judge Friendly did a chronological review from the Robbins case
in 1799 to the more recent cases involving the political offense exception. Id.
99. Id. at 137.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 503 (2d Cir. 1986).

1986]

REVIEW IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

magistrate's decision to deny a certificate is subject to review by declaratory judgment, the court first reviewed established extradition law. 10 2 According to the court, the government's only recourse for review was to
refile the extradition request with another magistrate. 0 3 The court
looked at several recent congressional attempts at legislative reform of
extradition law and observed that both the Department of Justice and
Department of State supported changing the law specifically because of
their limited options under current extradition procedure.'0 4 The Second
Circuit then considered the government's argument that broad application of the Declaratory Judgment Act encompassed extradition matters.10 5 The Court determined that allowing declaratory judgments in
extradition cases was contrary to both the policy of the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the language of section 3184.10'
Essentially, the government asked the court to interpret the political
offense exception narrowly and to certify Doherty for extradition. Because section 3184 forbids certification by an appellate court, the Second
Circuit reasoned that a declaratory judgment could, at most, result in a
favorable ruling on the application of the political offense exception to
Doherty. 107 Such a ruling would, however, have an inhibiting effect
upon subsequent extradition magistrates. The court emphasized, therefore, that its holding in Doherty applied specifically to that proceeding.' 08
The court next reflected upon the government's reliance on Wacker v.
Bisson.'0 9 The government asserted that if the extraditee could utilize
declaratory judgment to procure review of the grant of an extradition
certificate, it, too, ought to be able to employ the same technique to secure review of a denial." 0 The court stressed the extraditee can obtain
either habeas corpus or declaratory judgment review, provided the scope
of review is the same; the government, however, is simply not entitled to

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

494-97.
495.
496-97.
497.
498-99. The court looked at several sources as to the policy of the Act.

For example, "the declaratory judgment procedure 'creates a means by which rights and

obligations may be adjudicated in cases involving an actual controversy that has not
reached the stage at which either party may seek a coercive remedy, or in which the
party entitled to such a remedy fails to sue for it.' " Id. at 498 (quoting WRIGHT, THE
(4th ed. 1983)).
107. Id. at 499.
108. Id. at 499-500.
109. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
110. 786 F.2d at 500.

LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100
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review.'1 1 Finally, the court analyzed whether the government, acting in
its sovereign capacity, could challenge administrative action by a suit for
declaratory judgment."12 The Second Circuit distinguished the cases on
which the government relied, because they involved suits by private citizens."' 3 The government's sole recourse, therefore, was to resubmit Doherty's case to another extradition magistrate."1 4
IV.

COMMENT

Doherty is a case of first impression in any court 5 and one of late
Judge Friendly's last opinions prior to his death on March 11, 1986."'6
Clearly, the judicial and legislative history of extradition procedure contradicted the government's position, and the Court correctly decided the
case. While some of the government's arguments show creativity," 7 only
an extreme reading of the Declaratory Judgment Act would suggest that
Congress intended that it embrace extradition matters. The government
essentially argued that "parity" required that it, like the extraditee in
Wacker"18 have access to the declaratory judgment remedy. The government's reliance on Wacker is, however, misplaced. Wacker is unique in
extradition law because it is the only United States extradition case in
which an extraditee motioned for a declaratory judgment rather than
habeas corpus review. Because the scope of review in either approach is
the same, no extraditee has utilized the declaratory judgment method
since Wacker." 9 The Second Circuit refused to consider whether Wacker
was correctly decided.' 20 The government built its entire case, therefore,
on a shaky foundation. The Second Circuit arrived at the appropriate
result by holding that the government could not bring an action for declaratory judgment in order to acquire review of an order denying Doherty's extradition.
The real issue underlying the instant case is a policy question:
111. Id. at 501,
112. Id. at 502-03.
113. Id. at 503.
114. See id. at 495.
115. 615 F. Supp. 755, 758 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
116. 786 F.2d 491, 492 (2d Cir. 1986).
117. See, e.g., id. at 500 ("The Government argues that what is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander" (referring to Wacker)).
118. Id. at 501.
119. Id. "Since Wacker held that the scope of review in such an action is no broader
than in habeas, which is always available, extraditees have evidently not thought the
declaratory judgment game to be worth the candle." Id.
120. Id.
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whether the judiciary should continue to determine the political offense
exception in extradition cases. M The government has argued on several
occasions that the executive branch should decide whether a crime is a
"political offense" within the meaning of the relevant extradition
treaty.' 2 The government's argument has no basis in extradition law. In
fact, the premise generally accepted by the United States is "that extradition without judicial oversight [is] highly dangerous to liberty and
ought never to be allowed in this country.

12

3

Because courts contradict

the government's position, the executive has turned to Congress to obtain
a legislative resolution to the issue.
In the fifty-six cases involving requests by the United Kingdom for
extradition made since the enactment of the original Treaty, United
States courts denied only four.12* Because these highly publicized denials
involved PIRA members including Doherty, the government perceived a
need to amend the Treaty or alter treaty interpretation to avoid the political offense exception.125 In a message to the Senate, President Ronald
Reagan characterized the Supplementary Treaty as
represent[ing] a significant step in improving law enforcement cooperation
and combatting terrorism, by excluding from the scope of the political exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists, e.g., aircraft hijacking and sabotage, crimes against diplomats, hostage taking, and other
heinous acts such as murder, manslaughter, malicious assault, and certain
serious offenses involving firearms, explosives, and damage to property.1 26

121. See, e.g., id. at 498-99.
122. See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 513; In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 132-37.
123. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 135 (quoting In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 113

(1852)).
124. Supplemental Treaty Hearings, supra note 2, at 54 (Opening statement of Senator DeConcini). Senator DeConcini stated, "I have considerable faith in both the judges
in this country and in our system of checks and balances which allows the American
judicial system to play a real role in matters of this sort and not merely be the rubber
stamp for administration foreign policy decisions." Id.
125. S. Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985), reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1105 (1985)[hereinafter referred to as Supplementary Treaty]. The Senate
voted for ratification of the Supplementary Treaty, with modifications, on July 17, 1986.
See 132 CONG. REC. S9171 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). As of January, 1987, the United
Kingdom Order in Council had not yet ratified the Treaty. For a detailed analysis of the
Supplementary Treaty, see Note, Eliminatingthe Political Offense Exceptionfor Violent
Crimes: The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 755 (1986); see also Recent Developments, Extradition:
Limitation of the Political Offense Exception, 27 HARV. INT'L L. J. 266 (1986).
126. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 125, at III (Transmittal Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the United States Senate (July 17, 1985)).
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The original Supplementary Treaty significantly limited judicial determination of the political offense exception because it reduced the number of offenses regarded as political.12 7 Because most extraditees previously deemed political offenders would be certified by the judiciary for
extradition under the original Supplementary Treaty, the Secretary of
State would, in effect, have made the ultimate decision whether to extradite. Hence, the original Supplementary Treaty allowed the executive to
determine whether a particular offense was political based on current
28
foreign policy.'
While some scholars contend that executive treatment of political of-

127. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 125, at 1105-07. The original language of
article 1 provided:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following offenses shall be
regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature at Hague on 16 December 1970;
(b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal on
23 September 1971;
(c) an offense within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973;
(d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979;
(e) murder;
(f) manslaughter;
(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
(h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including
the taking of a hostage;
(i) the following offenses relating to explosives:
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious damage
to property; or
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who intends
either himself or through another person to endanger life or cause serious damage
to property;
(j) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
(1) the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either
himself or through another person to endanger life; or
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or
detention of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as
to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered;
(1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
128. See 132 CONG. REc. S9148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
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fenders is preferable,12 9 the United States has had a long history of judicially resolving questions of individual rights. 30 The political offense exception is closely linked to political asylum and the international
protection of human rights. 3 Judicial proceedings provide a public forum with an appearance of fairness and propriety to the international
community. 32 An additional advantage to judicial determination of the
political offense exception accrues to the executive by providing a "judicial shield."' ' By allowing the judiciary to make the initial decision
whether to extradite, the executive avoids criticism and confrontation
with the requesting nation. 4 Judicial determination, therefore, harmonizes the protection of political dissent with the punishment of wanton
violence.13 5
When the Senate ratified the Supplementary Treaty, it added several
amendments that substantially change current extradition law vis-a-vis
the United Kingdom. A new article 3(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of
the competent judicial authority by a preponderanceof the evidence that
the request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or
punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions.13 6
It is too early to determine whether PIRA defendants, like Doherty, will
be able to avoid extradition on the basis of their "political opinions,"
Article 3(a) specifically retains judicial prerogatives regarding the initial
extradition decision. The amendments direct the court to decide whether
to apply the humanitarian exception based on a preponderance of the
evidence. Significantly, article 3(b)137 provides the government with the

129.

See Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34

INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695 (1985); Note, PoliticalOffenses in Extradition:TimeforJudicial Abstention, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 131 (1981).

130. Lubet, supra note 38, at 284.
131. Id. at 283.
132. Id. at 287.
133. Id. at 285.
134. Id. at 285-87.
135. Id. at 291.
136. 132 CONG. REC. S9171 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (emphasis added).
137. The language of article 3(b) provides:
(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider the
defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for offenses listed in Article 1 of
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right to appeal to either the district court or court of appeals. The Senate
conditioned its ratification of the Supplementary Treaty on both the
United States and the United Kingdom's acceptance of the
amendments.13 8
The ultimate ramification of the Doherty decision is, therefore, to buttress longstanding extradition law which preserves the historic judicial
role and upholds international human rights.
Susan Kelm Story

this Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be immediately
appealable by either party to the United States district court, or court of appeals,
as appropriate. The appeal shall receive expedited consideration at every stage.
The time for filing a notice of appeal shall be 30 days from the date of the filing of
the decision. In all other respects, the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as appropriate, shall govern the appeals
process.

138.

Id. at S9148.

Case Comment
BANKRUPTCY-Section 304 Of The Bankruptcy Code Is Not An Exclusive Remedy In A Nonbankruptcy Court, Cunard Steamship Co.
Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. A.B., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Salen Reefer Services A.B. (Salen), a Scandinavian business entity, commenced a bankruptcy proceeding in the Kingdom of
Sweden 1 pursuant to Swedish bankruptcy law.2 Subsequently, plaintiff
Cunard Steamship Company, Ltd. (Cunard), an English company and
creditor of Salen,3 filed for an order of attachment in a United States
district court against the chattels held by United Brands Company, a
garnishee of Salen.4 After the district court granted the order, Salen
brought a motion to vacate the attachment, arguing that international
comity5 required the recognition of the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding

1. Salen commenced the bankruptcy proceeding on December 19, 1984, in Stockholm
City Court, Kingdom of Sweden.
2. The relevant Swedish bankruptcy statute, reprinted in the district court opinion,
states:
§ 23. After the publication of the bankruptcy decision, property belonging to the
bankruptcy estate may not be restrained for claims against the debtor. If such
restraint would nevertheless take place, it will not be valid. Notwithstanding the
bankruptcy, property which has been pledged for a certain claim may be restrained for the claim.
Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. A.B., 49 Bankr. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y.

1985).
3. Under both United States and Swedish bankruptcy law, Cunard is classified as a
general creditor of Salen.
4. Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. A.B., 49 Bankr. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Cunard alleged that Salen and Cunard had entered into a time charter with regard to a vessel called SCYTHIA and that subsequently Salen defaulted on its obligation
under the contract, resulting in damages of $1.1 million. On January 9, 1985, Cunard
obtained an order of attachment under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The order of attachment authorized the attachment of
goods in the amount of $1.1 million held by United Brands Company for Salen. Id. at
615.
5. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the Supreme Court provided the following standard for U.S. courts to use in determining whether to grant extraterritorial effect
to a foreign law or proceeding:
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which prohibited such attachment.6 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York agreed with Salen and vacated the
order of attachment by extending comity to the Swedish court and allowing a stay on creditors' actions.7 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirmed. Held: Section 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code is not an exclusive remedy for a bankruptcy trustee
who seeks to stay creditor actions and further, a district court does not
abuse its discretion by refusing to remand a foreign bankruptcy case to a
United States bankruptcy court. Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen
Reefer Serv., A.B., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Doctrine of Pluralism

Traditionally, United States courts have been reluctant to allow foreign trustees in bankruptcy to assert claims against the debtor's property
located in the United States.8 The doctrine of pluralism embodies this
protection of United States creditors. Under the doctrine of pluralism,

"Comity", in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64.
6. Salen brought the motion to vacate the attachment on January 24, 1985. Salen
also presented the testimony of a witness, Elisabeth Fura-Sandstroem, a Swedish attorney who represented the trustee of Salen's estate. Ms. Fura-Sandstroem testified that
according to Swedish law, all pending lawsuits are frozen and a meeting of creditors is
called after a judicial declaration of bankruptcy occurs. Cunard, 49 Bankr. at 616.
7. Id. at 619. The district court stated that the public policy of the United States
would best be served by extending comity to the Swedish bankruptcy proceedings and
staying creditor's actions. The district court then ordered the attachment vacated so that
the trustee could distribute Salen's assets in a single proceeding in Sweden pursuant to
Swedish law. Id. at 618-19.
8. See In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165, 167 (E.D. Mich. 1983). See generally
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (holding that a foreign court's allowance of a discharge in bankruptcy is not a defense against a creditor who is a citizen
of the United States unless the creditor consented to the foreign court's jurisdiction);
Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809) (noting that the bankruptcy law of a
foreign country cannot compel a legal transfer of property in the United States). But see
Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883) (holding that United States creditors were bound by the Canadian bankruptcy scheme because every person who deals
with a foreign corporation implicitly subjects himself to the laws of the foreign country).
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any country may maintain its own bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to
its own bankruptcy law without recognizing any foreign judgment that
might otherwise affect the outcome of the proceedings.9
Although the early United States courts did not explicitly recognize
pluralism, they reached similar results favoring United States creditors
by rarely granting extraterritorial effect to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.1 ° In Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit," the United States Supreme
Court implicitly adhered to the doctrine of plurality for the first time. In
Disconto Gesellschaft, a German citizen left Germany, settled in Wisconsin, and assumed a new name. 12 The German government apprehended the German citizen as a fugitive from justice one month after he
emigrated. The United States government extradited him to Germany. 3
A German bank, Disconto Gesellschaft, brought an action in a Wisconsin court against the German citizen the day after his arrest and at the
same time garnished his funds in the First National Bank of Milwaukee. 1 Meanwhile, the German bank instituted bankruptcy proceedings
in Germany against the German citizen. 5 Further, Disconto Gesellschaft presented its claim to the bankruptcy trustee and subsequently
petitioned the Wisconsin court to turn over the funds on deposit at the
Milwaukee bank to Germany for distribution in the German bankruptcy
proceeding. 6 The interpleaded defendant, a Wisconsin attorney who had
represented the German citizen, intervened in the suit, declaring that he

9. See In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Hensberger, Conflicts of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631,
634 (1980).
10. In addition to the case discussed in the text, see generally Cole v. Cunningham,
133 U.S. 107, 122-23 (1889) (stating that although all the parties were United States
citizens, the statutory titles of foreign assignees will be "recognized and enforced when it
can be done without injustice to the citizens of the State, and without prejudice to creditors pursuing their remedies under [the foreign forum's] statutes, provided, also, that
such title is not in conflict with the laws or public policy of the state. . ."); In re Waite,
99 N.Y. 433, 2 N.E. 440 (1885). For a discussion of the Waite case see Morales &
Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies:
The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAw. 1573, 1578 (1984).
11. 208 U.S. 570 (1908).

12. Id. at 576. The German changed his name from Gerhard Terlinden to Theodore
Grafe upon settling in the United States.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 574. Terlinden, alias Grafe, was in default of a judgment debt to Disconto
Gesellschaft. Disconto Gesellschaft claimed the $6,969.47 on deposit in Grafe's name at
the First National Bank of Milwaukee to satisfy a portion of the judgment debt.
15. Id. at 576.
16. Id. at 576-77.
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had a claim for services rendered. 17 The attorney argued that the funds
should remain in the United States. 8 The Circuit Court for Milwaukee
County found for the plaintiff and ordered the Milwaukee bank to turn
the funds over to Germany for distribution in the bankruptcy proceeding.19 The defendant attorney appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, which reversed. The court held that the removal of funds to a
foreign country to administer them under foreign bankruptcy law conflicted with Wisconsin public policy forbidding discrimination against
Wisconsin citizens. 20 The United States Supreme Court upheld the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, stating that the United States should
protect its citizens' property rights before allowing a foreign country to
take property out of the United States for a proceeding which favors
citizens of the foreign country. 2 '
Approximately eight years after Disconto Gesellschaft, a United States
District Court again applied the plurality approach in In re Berthoud.22
In Berthoud, the plaintiff, American Express Company, filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the defendant Berthoud. Although
Berthoud could not claim the United States as his principal place of business, his residence, or his domicile, 23 the court found that it had jurisdiction based solely upon the defendant's bank deposits in New York.2" The
court held that it had jurisdiction over the creditors and debtor as long as
the debtor had property located within the court's jurisdiction.2 5 Further
the court reasoned that it should not deny United States citizens their
right to have property located in the United States administered under
United States bankruptcy law, solely because the owner of the property
is not a United States citizen or resident.26 The court thereby protected
the United States creditors, who under English law might not have been
able to assert their claims.27

17. Id. at 575.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 577.
20. Id. at 578.
21. Id. at 582.
22. 231 F. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
23. Id. at 531.
24. Id. The bankrupt had more than $30,000 deposited in the National Park Bank.
25. Id. at 533.
26. Id. at 532.
27. Id. at 534. Under the English statute, the creditor was not entitled to present a
bankrupt petition against the debtor unless the act of bankruptcy occurred within three
months before the presentation of the petition. In the United States, however, the creditor
was given four months in which to act. Id.
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B.

The Development of Universality

In general United States courts have moved away from pluralism toward a universality approach."8 The universality theory requires that
courts in all jurisdictions recognize the bankruptcy decision rendered in
the debtor's jurisdiction. Therefore, only one bankruptcy proceeding is
necessary.29 Typically, the United States courts that adhere to some form
of universality grant comity to the foreign jurisdiction because of this
administrative consolidation. Accordingly, these courts emphasize deference to foreign bankruptcy proceedings, rather than protection of United
States creditors.
In the more recent cases, however, courts have not adopted a strict
view of universality. Rather, the courts focus on the potential harm to a
United States creditor caused by the extension of comity. Under this
modified approach the courts generally recognize the foreign court's
judgment unless the creditor proves that the granting of comity would
harm him.30 Specifically, the United States District Court of Hawaii, in
Waxman v. Kealoha,3' adopted the universality theory while recognizing
the policy of protecting United States creditors in limited instances. In
Waxman, a Canadian-appointed bankruptcy trustee brought suit in Hawaii on behalf of a Hawaiian corporation.3 2 The trustee sought to recover $71,500 of unpaid stock subscriptions from the corporation's Hawaiian incorporators and stockholders. 3
In reaching its decision to entertain the foreign trustees claim, the
Waxman court initially noted that although the bankruptcy courts of one
country should assist those of another, no court had formally prescribed

28. See Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Colorado
Corp., 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976); Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., Ltd., 471 F.
Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Waxman v. Kealoha, 296 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Haw. 1969);
see also Note, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has It Fostered the Development of
an "InternationalBankruptcy System"?, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541 (1984).
29. See In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165 (E.D.Mich. 1983); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 403-05 (4th ed. 1852), cited in Hensberger,
Conflicts of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
631, 633 (1980).
30. See In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (suggesting that United States
creditors bear the burden of proving the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code Section
304 factors); see also Morales & Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies. The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573, 1595
n.125 (1984).
31. 296 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Haw. 1969).
32. Id. at 1191.
33. Id. at 1192.
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the practice.34 The Waxman court further reasoned that because international treaties did not provide guidance, the courts should determine
whether foreign receivers in bankruptcy could maintain suits in the
United States to recover money owed to the bankrupt from general principles of comity."5 Finally, the court emphasized that "comity will be
extended in situations such as the one at bar, unless to do so would
prejudice local creditors and citizens."3 " Therefore, because the defendant failed to show that the court's granting of comity to the Canadian
decree would prejudice local creditors, the court found that it had juris37
diction to entertain the foreign trustee's claim.
Six years after the Waxman decision, the Second Circuit adhered to
the universality theory in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd.3 In
Fotochrome, the court extended comity in favor of a foreign creditor,
while leaving United States creditors unprotected. Fotochrome, Inc., a
Delaware Corporation, and Copal Co., a Japanese corporation, entered
into a contract in which Copal agreed to manufacture cameras for
Fotochrome.39 Additionally, the contract provided that the parties would
settle disputes by arbitration in Japan.4 ° After a dispute arose,4 1 Copal
filed a petition for arbitration in accordance with the contract. Subsequently, Fotochrome filed a bankruptcy petition in a New York bankruptcy court.4 2 In response, the referee issued a stay against arbitration.43 The Japanese arbitral panel, however, ignored the stay and found
for Copal." Copal then filed proof of its arbitral award in the
Fotochrome bankruptcy proceeding. 45 The District Court dismissed the

34. Id. The Waxman court quoted Nadelman, International Bankruptcy Law: Its
Present Status, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 324, 351 (1943) which states:
In view of the developments in other parts of the world, the fact that the United
States and Canada, immediate neighbours with a similar bankruptcy law, still are
without any agreement on questions of bankruptcy administrations involving both
countries, must appear strange.
35. 296 F. Supp. at 1193.
36. Id. at 1194.
37. Id.
38. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 514. Copal was not present or doing business in the United States.

40. Id.
41. The dispute arose because each party charged the other with failure to abide by
the terms of the contract. Copal claimed that Fotochrome failed to pay for delivered
cameras. Fotochrome claimed that delivery was late and that the cameras were defective.
42. 517 F.2d at 514.
43. Id. at 515.

44. Id.
45. Id.
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bankruptcy referee's restraining order because the Bankruptcy Court's
ruling had no extraterritorial effect and because the Bankruptcy Court
did not have jurisdiction over Copal. 46 On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed the holding of the District Court and permitted Copal to seek
confirmation of the arbitral award obtained in Japan.47 The court's
granting of comity with respect to the arbitral award arguably
prejudiced the United States creditors. Although the Fotochrome case
concerned a United States bankruptcy proceeding and not a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding, the decision signifies the trend away from protecting United States creditors.
One year after the Fotochrome decision, the Second Circuit advanced
the universality theory in Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen.48 In Clarkson,
a Canadian trustee brought suit in the United States to obtain records
located in the New York offices of the bankrupt's two Canadian corporations.49 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted a preliminary injunction requiring the bankrupt to
give the records to the trustee and restraining the bankrupt from disbursing property.50
On appeal, the Second Circuit applied the doctrine of comity. 51 The
court stated that in a comity case if a foreign trustee in bankruptcy meets
certain conditions New York courts must recognize the trustee's rights.
Specifically, a domestic court must recognize the rights of a foreign trustee as long as none of the following exceptions exist: (1) the foreign court
does not have jurisdiction over the bankrupt, or (2) the foreign proceeding will cause injustice to New York citizens and will prejudice a creditor's New York statutory remedies or (3) the foreign proceeding will
violate New York laws or public policy. 2 In addition, the Clarkson
court held that these exceptions should be construed narrowly when the
foreign jurisdiction is a sister common-law jurisdiction with procedures
similar to those used in the United States.5" Because the facts in Clarkson supported comity under New York law, the court allowed the Canadian trustee to discover the documents. In Clarkson the court adopted a
universality approach to comity, while it recognized a strong pluralistic

46.
United
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. The court stated that Copal did not have "minimum contacts" with the
States as required under Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
517 F.2d at 520.
544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id. at 630.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Cot. 19.911

preference for protecting the domestic creditor.54
In 1979, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York expanded the principle of comity to an almost pure universality approach in Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs. 55 Cornfeld, the
founder of Investors Overseas Services, Ltd. (I.O.S.) and a citizen of
New York, petitioned to attach the assets of I.O.S., the debtor in a Canadian bankruptcy proceeding. Emphasizing international comity, I.O.S.
sought to dismiss or stay Cornfeld's action based upon deference to the
Canadian proceeding. 56 The court noted that exceptions to the comity
doctrine had been narrowly construed in New York. "[Fjoreign-based
rights should be enforced unless the judicial enforcement of such a [right]
would be the approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious,
'5
wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense."
The Cornfeld court further stated the firm United States judicial policy to stay actions against a corporation which is the subject of a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding.58 Additionally, the court compared Canadian
and United States bankruptcy laws and concluded that the procedures
were similar. 59 For these reasons, the court extended comity to the Canadian bankruptcy proceeding and did not allow Cornfeld, the United
States creditor, to attach the Canadian debtor's assets located in the
United States. The Cornfeld case demonstrates, therefore, the movement
of the courts away from pluralism toward a more universal approach. 0

54. In addition to looking at whether the United States creditors would be prejudiced
by the foreign proceeding in determining whether to grant comity, some courts have
looked at whether the foreign court would grant reciprocity to U.S. courts in similar
situations. Under the universality approach, reciprocity is a minor factor and the inference is usually in favor of recognizing the foreign proceeding.
In In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976), the court was confronted
with whether it should refuse to grant comity to the foreign proceeding because Luxembourg or Netherlands Antilles might not grant comity to orders from United States bankruptcy courts. The court noted that reciprocity is a consideration in determining whether
to grant comity; however, the trustee in bankruptcy failed to present any evidence that
Luxembourg or Netherlands Antilles would not grant comity. The court, therefore, held
that the lower court abused its discretion in not granting comity to the orders of a foreign

court. Id. at 469.
55. 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
56. Id. at 1258.
57. Id. at 1259 (citing Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13,
203 N.E.2d 210, 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1964)).
58. 471 F. Supp. at 1259.
59, Id. at 1260.
60. But see Morales & Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573, 1582 (1984)
(suggesting that Cornfeld can be read narrowly).
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C. Section 304

-

The Blending of the Pluralism and the
Universality Doctrines

In 1978 Congress enacted section 304 to facilitate review of international bankruptcy cases.6 1 Upon filing a section 304 petition, a foreign
representative is able to commence an action in the United States that is
ancillary to the full bankruptcy proceeding in the foreign jurisdiction. A
full bankruptcy proceeding in the United States is, therefore, unnecessary, and the foreign representative does not suffer from exposure to the
broad jurisdiction of the United States courts. Once a foreign representative has filed a section 304 petition, the bankruptcy court can use its
discretion to decide what, if any, relief to grant.6 2 However, section
304(c) provides that in making that relief determination the court
should:
[B]e guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of [the bankrupt's] estate, consistent with (1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice
and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of
such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity63for a fresh start for
the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
On its face, section 304 embodies a mixture of pluralism and universality."' Accordingly, the bankruptcy code as amended favors the foreign
representative's administration of all assets, including those located in the
United States, when the United States creditors will not be prejudiced."
A problem arises in determining whether a section 304 petition must
be filed. Because section 304 is a relatively new section of the bankruptcy
code, the courts have not yet fully delineated the section's underlying
61.

Section 304 is a new provision in the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to its enactment,

no parallel section in the code existed.

62. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1982).
63.

11 U.S.C. § 304(c).

64. But see In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165, 167 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (stating
that section 304 embodies only the universality theory).

65. See Note, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has it Fostered the Development
of an "InternationalBankruptcy System"? 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541 (1984).
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procedural mechanism. 66 Thus, areas of uncertainty exist in the implementation of section 304. Specifically, the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Kenner Products Co. v. Socitb Fonciere et
67
Financiere
faced a situation in which the defendant failed to file a
section 304 petition. In Kenner, the plaintiff brought an action in the
United States against the bankrupt defendant on a guaranty of trade
credit for merchandise sold. The defendant sought to have the action dismissed without prejudicing the plaintiff's refiling in France, or, alternately, to transfer the action to the suspense docket pending the determination of the bankruptcy proceeding in France. 8 The defendant did not
file a section 304 petition and the court did not mention the need for a
section 304 petition. Without addressing the issue of whether a section
304 petition should have been filed, the court found that comity and
United States public policy required that it defer to the French bankruptcy court.69 By sidestepping the issue, the Kenner court left open for
debate whether it implicitly found that a section 304 petition was not the
exclusive remedy.
Four months later, however, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York emphasized in RBS Fabrics Ltd. v. G.
Beckers & Le Hanne7 0 the need for a foreign representative to file a
section 304 petition when it has assets in the United States. In RBS
Fabrics,the bankrupt defendant sought to dismiss the plaintiff's order of
attachment on the defendant's assets. To this end, the defendant argued
that the plaintiff's action should have been brought in Germany pursuant to an alleged contractual forum selection clause or, in the alternative,
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens applied. 71 Additionally, in
preliminary discussions with the court the defendant argued that if the
court, denied its motion to dismiss, it would commence an action pursuant to section 304 in a United States bankruptcy court.7 2 Subsequently,
the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff's attachment. 73 The court based its ruling on the representation by
the defendant that it would commence a proceeding under section 304 in

66. See In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that "the procedural and substantive contours of the attenuated but elastic provisions of 11 U.S.C. Section 304 are still unchartered. .. ").
67. 532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 479.
70. 24 Bankr. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
71. Id. at 199.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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a United States bankruptcy court.7 4 The court further stated that "the
preferable procedure is to have the ancillary proceeding brought in the
United States bankruptcy court so that the provisions of 11 U.S.C. settion 304(b) and (c) can be applied by the bankruptcy court. ...
The few courts that have interpreted section 304 focused sharply on
the first factors of the section and particularly on whether the creditor's
interest would be protected if the court recognized the foreign proceedings.7 6 In In re Lineas Areas De Nicaragua, S.A. 7 the bankruptcy
court for the Southern District of Florida became one of the first courts
to consider whether to grant relief to a foreign representative under section 304. In Lineas Areas, the Nicaraguan bankrupt commenced an ancillary case in a United States bankruptcy court under section 304.8 The
bankruptcy court ordered the turnover of the debtor's property to the
debtor's foreign representative, although in reality the assets remained in
the United States.7 9 In reaching its decision, the bankruptcy court retained significant control over the debtor's assets. Specifically, the foreign
trustee promised the court that none of the debtor's assets would be removed from the United States and that the debtor would use the assets
primarily to satisfy the debts he owed United States creditors. 80 Further,
the court prohibited the trustee from encumbering, assigning or abandoning the debtor's assets located in the United States.81 Finally, the
court ordered the trustee to file an inventory of the debtor's assets located
in the United States so the court could maintain even greater control
82
over assets.
The bankruptcy court's decision in Lineas Areas illustrates that al-

74. Id.
75. Id. at 200.
76. In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); RBS Fabrics Ltd. v. G. Beckers
& Le Hanne, 24 Bankr. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Egeria Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 20 Bankr. 625 (E.D. Va. 1982).
77. 10 Bankr. 790 (S.D. Fla. 1981).

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. In a subsequent action in the same case, the court appointed a domestic cotrustee when it became apparent that the foreign trustee had a conflict of interest which
might prevent him from acting in the best interests of U.S. trustee. The court noted that
section 304(b)(3) gives courts broad authority to order the appropriate relief. The court
also stated that Congress gave the courts maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases
so that they could fashion the appropriate relief for each case, balancing the comity interest and the claimholders' interest. In re Lineas Areas De Nicaragua, S.A., 13 Bankr.
779, 780 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
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though a court may recognize a foreign bankruptcy proceeding under
section 304, the court still focuses on the protection of the United States
creditors and the maintenance of control over the debtors' assets in the
United States. This emphasis on protecting United States creditors again
demonstrates that, although universality principles underly section 304,
the courts seem to focus on pluralism theories when applying the
provision.
In 1982 a bankruptcy court applied the traditional universality approach to a section 304 case. In In re Culmer 3 the court focused its
analysis on the "policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign
court." 4 In Culmer, a banking company, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas
Limited (BAOL), became involved in bankruptcy liquidation under the
Bahamian bankruptcy laws. On behalf of BAOL, the liquidators filed a
section 304 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York. 5 Subsequently, the bankruptcy court issued
an order requesting all interested parties to show cause why the court
should not grant the relief sought in the section 304 petition. In response, several entities contested the section 304 petition. In particular,
Ultrafin International Corporation moved to dismiss the section 304 petition on the ground that BAOL was engaged in the banking business in
the United States and was not eligible for section 304 relief under 11
U.S.C. section 109.87
To reach its decision, the Culmer court examined the section 304(c)
factors. 8 The court noted that Congress intended that the courts use
these factors flexibly.8 9 Initially, the Culmer court examined subsections
(c)(1), (2), (3), and (4) and found that the creditor had not submitted
concrete evidence of any wrong-doing or propensity for wrong-doing by
BAOL. 0 The court stated that "the central examination which it must
undertake in order to comply with section 304(c) is whether the relief
petitioners seek will afford equality of distribution of the available assets."" Applying the criteria, the Culmer court found that the Bahamian

83. 25 Bankr. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
84. Id. at 629.
85.

Id. at 623.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 623-24.
88.

Id. at 627-32.

89. Id at 627-28.
90. Id. at 627-31.
91.

Id. at 628. The legislative history of section 304 states that the factors are:
. . designed to give the court maximum flexibility in handling
ancillary cases. Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments

[G]uidelines .
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liquidation complied with section 304(c) and the principle of equal distribution. 2 The court also applied an interest analysis balancing the interests of the United States, the Bahamas, and the State of New York,
and found that the Bahamas had the greatest interest in BAOL's
liquidation."'
Although the Culmer court examined all of the section 304(c) factors,
it stated that historically the courts have relied on principles of comity. 4
The Culmer court held that the other factors of section 304 are only
used to determine whether the application of Bahamian law would be
"wicked, immoral, or violate American law and public policy."9 5 The
court further noted that the Bahamian bankruptcy law substantially conformed with United States bankruptcy law and that the Bahamas, like
Canada, is a sister common-law jurisdiction with procedures similar to
those of the United States. 6 Based on principles of comity and on these
97
facts, the court granted the section 304 petition for ancillary relief.
Conversely, in In re Matter of Toga Mfg., Ltd.,98 the bankruptcy
court moved away from universality and protected the rights of the local
creditors. In Toga, a Canadian trustee filed a section 304 petition for
Toga Manufacturing, Limited (Toga).9 Prior to the filing, the debtor
contracted with Peter T. Hesse Enterprises, Inc. (Hesse), a Michigan
corporation, to make Hesse a sales representative for Toga."°0 Under the
contract, the parties agreed to submit any contractual disputes to the
American Arbitration Association. 0 1 After a dispute did arise, the
American Arbitration Association entered an award for Hesse," 2 which
perfected its judgment by serving writs of garnishment on some of Toga's

and laws of other nations suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible rules.
Id., quoting H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 324-25 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6281, and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5821.
92. 25 Bankr. at 628.
93. Id. at 628-29.
94. Id. at 629.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 629-31.
97. Id. at 633-34."
98. 28 Bankr. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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creditors."' 3 Under United States law Hesse, a lien creditor, would be
one of the first creditors to receive payment.10 4 Under Canadian bankruptcy law, however, Hesse would most likely be considered an "ordinary creditor.

10 5

The Toga court noted that under Canadian bankruptcy law, Hesse
would not receive priority "substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title" as required in section 304(c)(4).'0 8 Accordingly,
the Toga court held that comity required that Hesse's claim remain in
the United States courts. Otherwise, under Canadian bankruptcy law,
Hesse would receive treatment substantially unequal to other creditors.107 Thus, the Toga court strictly adhered to the section 304 factors
in refusing to grant comity.
III.

INSTANT OPINION

In Cunard the Second Circuit first addressed the question of whether
section 304 is the exclusive remedy for a representative who seeks to stay
or enjoin creditor actions in the United States.1 08 In resolving this issue
the court noted that the section 304 remedy is intended to be broad and
flexible. 0 9 In addition, the court held that although it preferred referral
of the case from the district court to a bankruptcy court, the fact that the
district court failed to allow removal did not require a reversal of the
district court's ruling.11 0

103.

Id. at 166.

104. Id. at 168.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 170. The Toga court further stated that comity might be granted if the
United States and Canada had a treaty based on reciprocity. Although at the time of the
Toga decision a proposed United States - Canada bankruptcy treaty did exist, the Canadian Parliament and the United States Senate had not ratified it. Id. at 169.
108. Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Servs., A.B., 773 F.2d 452, 454 (2d
Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 455; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong; 2d Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5821 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 989];
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 324-25 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6281 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 595].
110. The court noted that bankruptcy courts are historically favored to adjudicate
bankruptcy cases because of their expertise in the subject matter. Cunard, 773 F.2d at
455; see, e.g., In re Raiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983).
The instant court also stated that nothing in the statue or in the legislative history
shows a clear congressional mandate that section 304 is the exclusive remedy for a foreign trustee. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 455. Accordingly, the court said that the Senate and
House reports state that "the foreign representative may file a petition under this sec-
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In determining that section 304 was not an exclusive remedy, the Second Circuit stated that courts could still decide international bankruptcy
cases based upon the principles of comity.'1 1 After examining section 304
as Congress originally introduced it, the court found that comity remained a viable remedy. The Second Circuit noted that the original section 304 did not refer to comity." 2 Congress amended the original proposal to require the bankruptcy courts to consider comity along with the
other factors in section 304.111 The instant court stated:
It is clear that the drafters of the original bill did not intend to overrule in
foreign bankruptcies well-established principles based on considerations of
international comity. A more reasonable interpretation is that comity was
added to section 304(c) to clarify and require that comity must be considered in ancillary proceedings in the bankruptcy court.114
Finally, the Cunard court noted that when Congress prescribes an additional statutory remedy, it is exclusive if Congress so states.11 5
After finding that comity was a proper remedy in this case, the Second
Circuit determined that the district court acted properly in extending
comity to the Swedish court's bankruptcy proceeding. The Second Circuit noted that it would grant comity if the foreign court had competent
jurisdiction and the extension of comity would not violate the laws and
public policy of the forum state and the rights of the forum's residents.1 1
The circuit court then responded to appellant Cunard's argument that
the district court should not have granted comity because the Swedish
bankruptcy court lacked in personam jurisdiction over Cunard and
lacked in rem jurisdiction over the attached property.' 117 The instant
court first noted that the concept of due process only required proof of in
personam jurisdiction over the debtor before comity would be granted to
a foreign court."1 8 The Second Circuit also noted the policy rationale of
extending comity to a foreign court because of the advantage of having a
single court disperse the debtor's assets in an "equitable, orderly and

tion." Id. at 456 (citing S. REP. No. 989, supra note 109, at 35, and H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 109, at 324 (emphasis added by the court).
111. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 456.
112. Id. See H.R. REP. No. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304, reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCy, app. III (1984).
113. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 456; see 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (1982).
114. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 456 (citations omitted).
115. Id. (citing, Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283,'313 (2d Cir. 1980)).
116. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 457.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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systematic manner, rather than in a haphazard, erratic or piecemeal
fashion." '
The court further found that the principles of Swedish bankruptcy
law are similar to the principles incorporated in the United States bankruptcy code. 120 The guiding premise of the bankruptcy code is equality
in the distribution of assets among creditors. 2 ' The court found that
under either United States law or under Swedish bankruptcy law,
Cunard would not receive preference over other creditors. 2 2 Additionally, the instant court suggested that Sweden had a greater interest in
protecting Cunard because (1) Cunard was incorporated in England; (2)
the contract at issue had no connection with the United States; and (3)
23
Salen is a Swedish business entity.1
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that although it considered reciprocity a factor, the court would not require reciprocity from another country
as a prerequisite to granting comity.' 24 Cunard argued that a Swedish
court would not grant comity to a United States bankruptcy proceeding
in situations similar to the case at bar. The instant court held, however,
that neither party presented proof that conclusively established what the
Swedish courts would do in a similar situation. Thus, because reciprocity
was not an essential element of comity, and because the parties did not
establish the absence of reciprocity, the Second Circuit held that the dis25
trict court did not abuse its discretion in granting comity.

119. Id. at 458. The instant court also stated that the United States courts have
continually recognized the interest of foreign courts in liquidating the affairs of their
domestic business entities. Id.
120. Id. at 459. The instant court considered Cunard's argument that the vacating
the attachment order violated United States public policy in favor of arbitration. The
court noted that, although the public policy in favor of arbitration was strong, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act indicated that arbitrators are still subject to automatic
status under section 362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. In addition, the instant court noted that Cunard had not shown that the
laws or the public policy of the United States would be violated by granting comity to the
Swedish bankruptcy proceeding. Instead, the court said the public policy of the United
States would best be served by recognizing the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding. Cunard
also failed to show that any United States citizens would be prejudiced if they had to
participate in the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
124. Id. at 460.
125. Id. Cunard also argued that Salen failed to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 44.1 which requires reasonable notice of a party's intention to prove
foreign law. The court, however, found that Cunard was informed of the fact that the
Swedish bankruptcy proceeding was a central issue in the case and therefore had reasonable notice of the foreign law. Id. at 460-61.
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IV.

COMMENT

The instant court continues the trend of expanding universality and
deferring to foreign bankruptcy proceedings that Congress began with
the enactment of section 304. Prior to Cunard, only one court addressed
the issue of whether to apply section 304 as a preferred remedy. The
court in RBS Fabrics,Ltd. concluded that section 304 was preferred.12
The instant court, however, expanded on this foundation and declared
that section 304 is not the only method a foreign bankruptcy trustee who
wishes to stay or enjoin creditor actions in the United States may use to
obtain comity. 2 ' Although the instant court agreed with the RBS
Fabrics court that section 304 was the preferred remedy, courts now are
free to grant comity outside of a section 304 proceeding.
The court also decided that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to refer this case to a bankruptcy court.12 In so holding,
the instant court in effect has declared that a foreign bankrupt can go
directly to a district court in New York without filing a section 304 petition and without first confronting a bankruptcy court. This holding conflicts directly with congressional intent. Congress specifically enacted section 304 to deal with situations such as the case before the instant court.
By declaring that section 304 is not an exclusive remedy, the instant
court has made it possible for all United States courts to ignore the section 304 factors and base their decisions on the very subjective concept of
comity. Arguably, Congress should not have left this issue to the discretion of the courts but should have required section 304 as an exclusive
remedy.
Since the enactment of section 304, when a foreign bankruptcy case
comes before a district court, the district court generally decides the case
based solely on comity without explicitly looking at any other section 304
factors.12 9 Conversely, when a foreign bankruptcy case comes before a
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court evaluates all the section 304 factors.130 Because the results may differ substantially, a rational foreign
bankrupt might forum shop for the court most likely to recognize the
foreign bankruptcy proceedings. In fact, in at least one case before a
bankruptcy court, the result might have been different if the case had
3
been before a district court.1 '

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
Cunard, 773 F.2d at 460.
See supra notes 55-60 and 66-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-107 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text. In Toga, the court closely ana-
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Because results may differ substantially, the Second Circuit should
have remanded the case to a bankruptcy court and found it an abuse of
discretion for the district court not to have done so. Because the instant
court did not remand the case, it arguably violated congressional intent
because Congress specifically established the Article I bankruptcy courts
to address bankruptcy matters. Bankruptcy courts have more expertise in
the bankruptcy area and are more familiar with foreign bankruptcy
codes. They are therefore more likely to be both expedient and efficient.132 In addition, the bankruptcy courts will be more inclined to focus
on all the section 304 factors and not just on comity.
The instant court has quashed the efforts of Congress to deal with
foreign bankruptcy problems and to establish bankruptcy courts to adjudicate barkruptcy issues. In doing so, the instant court has made it possible for courts to either revert to pluralism and protect United States
creditors without really considering recognition of the foreign bankruptcy
proceedings or, conversely, to rely on pure universality notions and defer
to foreign proceedings without ever considering the effect on United
States creditors. In the future, the district courts should defer these cases
to the bankruptcy courts. Moreover, the appellate courts should find it
an abuse of discretion if district courts do not defer to the bankruptcy
courts. As a result of these changes, bankruptcy courts will analyze the
section 304 factors, and consistency and fairness should be the result.
Laura F. Howard

lyzed each of the section 304 factors and found that under subsection (c)(4) the creditor
would not receive substantially equal treatment compared to other creditors. If the Toga
court had not used section 304 in its analysis and focused on comity, instead, it may not
have considered the unequal treatment creditors might receive and might have granted

comity on other grounds.
132.

The district court in Cunard took almost four months to render a decision.

